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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. military is adept at coordinating fires and maneuver of forces associated 
with the kinetic aspects of engagements; they have also proven effective in the non-kinetic 
realm of the information environment. Despite decades of military operations in the 
information environment, there has been limited success in integrating these capabilities 
with those associated with operations in the physical environment. The U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Marine Corps have identified gaps in their ability to effectively coordinate events in these 
environments in support of a common operational objective. This research focuses on the 
convergence between the information and physical environments as it affects the ability to 
effectively employ non-kinetic and kinetic munitions. Our efforts seek to discover the 
gaps and redundancies in the capabilities at the theater level of command that interfere 
with operational efficiencies. Additionally, we examine the current organizational 
structures associated with each type of operational capability and identify gaps and 
redundancies that may be contributing to inefficient coordination of fires and maneuver 
across the theater of operations. Our findings suggest that certain behavioral 
conditions, developmental considerations, necessary non-lethal reference point 
dissemination, and poorly defined information capabilities have contributed to 
overreliance on kinetic munitions and underutilized non-kinetic munitions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
Since the Cold War ended, the United States (U.S.) has sustained a globally 
influencing, highly lethal, and geographically expansive military (Brose, 2020, p. 188). 
The confidence resulting from this powerful certainty and the strategic lessons learned 
from recent conflicts against economically and technologically inferior forces have 
encouraged reliance on traditional warfare platforms that project power and precision strike 
capabilities with their assigned payload sets (Brose, 2020, p. 49). This reliance on existing 
platforms and technological capabilities to deter conflict and maintain security becomes 
more standardized practice with each confirmed Department of Defense (DOD) Budget 
(Brose, 2020, p. 213). However, America’s approach to global military supremacy has 
diminished its ability to fight future conflicts (Rid & Hecker, 2009, p. 78). As a professional 
in National Security Affairs, Dr. Zachary Shore (2008) identifies this dangerous 
complacency as “Static Cling” which he defines as, “the cognition trap that prevents us 
from either recognizing or accepting a changing world” (p. 184). Within this readiness gap, 
near peer competitors to the U.S. are boldly (and creatively) expanding their means to 
challenge American defenses. 
Weapon systems technology, capabilities, and international tension are expanding 
at an alarming rate. In 2019, Russia added a second hypersonic nuclear capable missile to 
its arsenal that advertises a speed exceeding 20 times the speed of sound (Bratersky, 2021, 
para.5). In 2020, the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense announced that China 
possessed the world’s largest navy, ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-
launched cruise missiles with ranges exceeding American ground-launched ballistic 
missiles, and one of the world’s largest integrated air defense systems (DOD, 2020, p. ii). 
China has also been actively stealing intellectual property from the U.S. to expeditiously 
close the gap between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities and gain better insight into 
exploitive countermeasures (Brose, 2020, p. 36).  
Extending beyond continually expanding physical arsenal displays of power, 
American adversaries are also exerting pervasive international influence by capitalizing on 
integrated operations in the information environment (OIE) that redefine conventional 
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confrontations. Both state and non-state adversaries to the U.S. are capitalizing on the 
effects achieved from creatively incorporating physical assets and technological 
capabilities into larger strategic objectives. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director 
William Burns stated that Russia’s current (2021) buildup of military forces along the 
Ukrainian border threatens Ukrainian leadership while also attempting to exhibit a 
stationary projection of dominance toward the United States (Open Hearing: Worldwide 
Threats, 2021). Likewise, North Korean propaganda videos such as the one filmed in 2017 
at a patriotic military concert celebrating the 105th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung 
depicting an intercontinental ballistic missile destroying a city very reminiscent of San 
Francisco amid a burning American flag in front of a U.S. National Cemetery (Bacon, 
2017, para. 2) similarly seek to change behaviors through exerting international influence.  
These military operations reaching beyond the physical impact of conventional 
munitions are not limited to misinformation, disinformation, and psychological operations. 
Expanding connectivity and reliance on internet and software-based technologies are 
encouraging advanced cyber-attack opportunities extending across the physical, logical, 
and social network layers to produce logical and physical effects (Joint Chiefs of Staff 
[JCS], 2018, pp. I-2 to I-4). According to the recently founded (December 2019) U.S. 
Space Force’s Mission Statement, outer space is definitively another defense operating 
environment that serves to, “protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to provide space 
capabilities to the joint force… acquiring military space systems, maturing the military 
doctrine for space power, and organizing space forces to present to our Combatant 
Commands” (U.S. Space Force). International space and space-technology (including 
satellite) pursuits are dramatically expanding and challenging pre-existing battlefield 
definitions. Additionally, expansive manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum is 
defining new tactics for electronic warfare (EW) that impact maneuver element decisions 
and effectiveness. As General Berger (38th Commandant of the United States Marine 
Corps [USMC]) describes in his Force Design 2030, “We have shortfalls in… high-
endurance, long-range unmanned systems with Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities” 
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(Department of the Navy [DON], 2020, p. 2). These shortfalls require innovative solutions 
exploiting all aspects of the information and physical environments. 
American warfare and its associated munitions must constantly adapt to all 
perceived and actual threats in order to maintain superiority, deter unnecessary conflict, 
and respond effectively and efficiently should aggravated conflict occur. With the 
expanding physical reach and capabilities resulting from information availability and 
technological development, traditional approaches to payload choice and employment 
must adjust in order to remain applicable and successful throughout the theater of 
operations.  
Modern targeting efficiency depends on weapon systems capable of integrating 
kinetic and non-kinetic payloads. However, this emphasis on non-kinetic and kinetic 
munitions remains vague, sporadically defined, and therefore often neglected as a viable 
and necessary component to target development and payload choices. According to Mr. S. 
Iatrou, NPS senior lecturer (personal communication, May 10, 2021) kinetic munitions can 
be defined as applied energy in the physical domain, while non-kinetic munitions can be 
defined as applied energy in the cognitive domain. Applied energy in the physical domain 
tangibly transits from point of release to target impact and the applied energy in the 
cognitive domain encompasses actions taken across the electromagnetic spectrum, in the 
cyber-domain, and throughout behavioral interactions. These definitions do not constrict 
either munition (kinetic or non-kinetic) from producing effects in either the information or 
physical environments, nor do they constrain kinetic to lethal effects and non-kinetic to 
non-lethal effects. 
The confusion and lack of specificity surrounding non-kinetic fires has resulted in 
hesitancy to select them as munition choices. Non-kinetic fires are not sufficiently 
understood, are not well defined within the DOD, and subsequently are not reinforced as 
necessary response measures. Non-kinetic fires are also delivered through multiple 
different Information-Related Capabilities (IRC) that each encompass various occupational 
specialties, require specific technical proficiencies, and do not always deliver results at the 
same rate as kinetic fires. Conversely, kinetic fires can be mechanically described and 
produce tangible results that have many physical attributes. These consistent physical 
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results and the methodical process to match kinetic payload to desired effect on targets has 
resulted in over-reliance on kinetic options.  
Although non-kinetic munitions operate differently than kinetic munitions, their 
integration across the range of operations is increasingly more apparent and necessary. As 
near peer competitors to the U.S. aggressively pursue similar non-kinetic technological 
integration at a pace uninhibited by democratic procedures and requirements, American 
resources must address these new threats spanning the information and physical 
environments. While kinetic munitions will always be required for defense, non-kinetic 
munition integration can maximize their effectiveness or mitigate their use (allowing for 
greater physical capability sustainment during combat).  
This research attempts to identify possible impedances preventing non-kinetic and 
kinetic munition integration across the range of military operations and propose increased 
means for alleviating the friction incurred by those circumstances. This research focuses 
on both the information and physical environments to uncover operational hindrances 
toward understanding and employing non-kinetic munitions as either solitary fires or in 
conjunction with kinetic fires. Within the information environment, emphasis falls on 
behavioral aspects of the defense institution. Within the physical environment, this research 
explores force development factors, non-kinetic targeting points, misunderstood 
capabilities, and application relevancies. This research concludes with a summary of 
identified deficiencies in the information and physical environments and associated 
corrective measures.  
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II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. ADDRESSING COGNITIVE BIASES  
A significant requirement for successfully integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires 
across the theater of operations is acknowledging and addressing cognitive biases 
inhibiting information operations. As the director of research and education at the Canadian 
Special Operations Command, Emily Spencer (2018) defines cognitive biases as, “mental 
shortcuts” that facilitate expeditious decision making (p. 87). Bias in itself is not inherently 
malicious, detrimental, or exclusionary. Due to the high rate and large magnitude of 
operational information collection and processing, Spencer (2018) explains that certain 
cognitive biases may actually expedite decision-making because, “cognitive biases are 
simplified information processing strategies” (p. 89). This speed enables commanders to 
maintain tempo in accordance with actions on objective. However, certain cognitive biases 
impede willingness to employ and capitalize on non-kinetic munitions. 
Kinetic munition payloads have specific effects with results that are largely 
consistent, reliant, and repeatable. Kinetic munitions also reflect physical tangibility and 
represent observable force protection capabilities. Non-kinetic munitions are often 
intangible and have aspects that cannot be observed under the same conditions as kinetic. 
Because of this disparity, the potential for over-reliance on kinetic weapons systems can 
be more common and immediate. While many cognitive biases may be present, the 
confirmation bias, availability heuristic, and mere exposure effect are all potential 
hindrances toward effectively and efficiently employing non-kinetic fires in place of (or 
concurrent with) kinetic munitions. 
The confirmation bias suggests that individuals exhibit a tendency to seek and 
believe claims that support their previously established beliefs (Spencer, 2018). In tactical 
and operational environments, this bias may inadvertently affect individual military 
occupational specialty training schools. When contemporary U.S. military commanders 
and decision makers are beginning their profession and learning the skill sets necessary for 
a varied and unique range of operating environments, most future leaders are 
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impressionable and formed under circumstances where they have only known their country 
to be a global superpower (Brose, 2020, p. 86). Furthermore, the majority of occupational 
specialties (as is appropriate) are warfare centric and support forward forces in the physical 
environment. 
Significant training is required to operate various weapons systems and 
corresponding confidence that probabilities of hit and kill will remain consistent are 
necessary pre-requisites for employment. Warfighters are instructed on kinetic systems’ 
individual mechanical specifications, rates of fire, effective ranges, and associated 
employment considerations affected by human engagement (USMC). These physically 
controlled and maintained parameters reinforce historical conceptions and accounts of 
American military prowess and technological superiority. Despite the necessities of kinetic 
weapons system employment and payload options in the physical environment, it is also 
important to consider reliance levels on their usage. If the military is developed to 
predominantly believe that kinetic munitions are the sole, major, or singular option for 
response measures, that will reinforce a confirmation bias that excludes the use of non-
kinetic munitions as standalone or complimentary options. While it may appear 
counterintuitive in military environments to encourage focus on alternative ways to 
consider a problem and solution, willful attention to counterintuitive processes alleviates 
the negative effects of confirmation bias (Spencer, 2018, p.91) and enables opportunities 
for non-kinetic options. 
When anecdotes of U.S. military supremacy are recounted, analyzed (which is a 
natural process for strategists), and coupled with extensive weapon system availability, the 
potential grows for unintended cognitive bias influence. In these instances, the availability 
heuristic may incline commanders to choose kinetic options when non-kinetic options may 
be more appropriate. The availability heuristic suggests that greater memory availability of 
an event leads to stronger belief in that event recurring (Spencer, 2018, p.90). Historical 
over-reliance on kinetic options has resulted in a majority of similar responses to conflict. 
Developing military leaders with historical narratives is not wrong. Recognizing 
(and appropriately matching) adversarial threats to appropriate responses while 
understanding the implications of those threats greatly benefits from prior case studies and 
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analysis. However, awareness of availability bias presence and potential effect is also 
important. If left unchecked, the availability bias may lead to assumptions based on 
historical actions that are not the best option for the given scenario. Furthermore, those 
scenarios may not require or respond to the same reactions that were initiated under prior 
circumstances. Re-evaluating responses with respect to objective factors such as tempo, 
objectives, and the adversary’s unique nature can counter availability bias influence 
(Spencer, 2018, p.90) and facilitate the creative integration and employment of non-kinetic 
munitions.  
Similar to the confirmation bias and availability heuristic, the mere exposure effect 
is an additional cognitive bias that can unduly influence military forces toward neglecting 
the possibility and subsequent advantages of integrating non-kinetic opportunities into their 
concepts of operation. The mere exposure effect suggests a tendency to rely on things 
simply because of familiarity with them (Spencer, 2018, p. 93). Within the scope of 
military operational planning, there is substantial familiarity and trust in kinetic fires and 
maneuver that deepens with successful mission executions. Considering the tangible and 
physical nature of kinetic exposure (individual weapons systems, aircraft, naval 
capabilities, ground assets, etc.) surrounding forces have more difficulty recognizing the 
non-kinetic equivalence. Additionally, the mere exposure effect may exasperate reliance 
on kinetic munitions because of their historical success. The more kinetic munitions 
effectively demonstrate effects on targets, the stronger the corresponding risk grows of 
viewing them as primary choices. Because non-kinetic exposure exists in much more 
logical and intangible spaces, there is more difficulty countering the reliance on kinetic. 
Although challenging, recognizing the effect of mere exposure effect is a significant 
component to enabling more non-kinetic integration. Military planners and commanders 
must strive to remember that system proficiency and familiarity do not necessarily dictate 
best value choices (Spencer, 2018, p. 93). 
Understanding the definitions of cognitive biases and the various extents to which 
they might be present across commands and operational environments can alleviate some 
of the unintentional friction inhibiting non-kinetic opportunities. Although it is more 
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difficult to interpret non-kinetic payloads and subsequently measure effects on target, that 
frustration cannot discount OIE as viable measures. 
B. ADDRESSING INFLUENCE FACTORS 
Similar to cognitive biases, commanders and operational planners must consider 
the associated influence factors affecting non-kinetic integration throughout the theater of 
operations. Because of the military’s institutional hierarchy, commanders and senior 
leaders should be acutely aware of the influences they exert over the men and women they 
lead. As an experimental social psychologist, Robert Cialdini (1984) describes that 
professional titles (or equivalent command levels, billet titles, and occupational specialties 
within the military context) can influence more profoundly than the person bearing that 
title (p. 222). These command titles are necessary for maintaining good order and 
discipline, assuming varying levels of responsibility, and ensuring operational coordination 
and communication. However, there is risk associated with authoritative influence in the 
defense establishment. This influence can either promote or hinder embracing non-kinetic 
operations as conducive to furthering operational objectives.  
Since military leaders who coordinate fires and plan maneuvers at tactical levels 
are generally more senior in rank and experience, it becomes incumbent upon those 
positions to be aware of their influence that may already be affected by cognitive biases 
and focused on employing kinetic fires. As Cialdini further describes, symbols of authority 
can directly influence behavior (1984, p. 222). If those symbols are leaders who are already 
exhibiting exaggerated tendencies for kinetic targeting, the resulting operations will 
become even more difficult for non-kinetic integration. 
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III. FINDINGS  
A. CREATIVITY 
The U.S. military is a well-disciplined, organized, and hierarchical system with 
rigid structural processes and fixed operational procedures. This description and these 
practices are necessary for efficient mission execution and proficiency sustainment. The 
skills and control measures to develop a force capable of these expectations are largely 
focused on successfully executing kinetic fires in the physical environment. Professional 
development and integration of non-kinetic systems operators is far less emphasized. For 
example, the USMC Technical Information Operations Officer is a secondary military 
occupational specialty received after postgraduate education at Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). This secondary nature of the “8834” (Technical Information Operations Officer) 
billet designation is limiting. Furthermore, of the 334 U.S. Marines eligible and selected 
for advanced education opportunities on the fiscal year 2021 Commandant’s Career Level 
Education Board, only one individual was selected for the Information Warfare Systems 
program (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2020).  
This focus on kinetic systems is not inherently negative. However, these 
developmental efforts result in warfighters that are significantly more proficient and 
capable of executing kinetic operations and deficient on non-kinetic alternatives. While 
this is understandable due to the potentially catastrophic physical ramifications associated 
with employing kinetic weapons systems, future engagements will require understanding 
and exploiting non-kinetic systems for success. The hesitancy to employ non-kinetic 
systems due to fear of unintended outcomes will increase if kinetic munitions are routinely 
employed instead of appropriate non-kinetic options. 
While kinetic tactical and operational expertise is required for strategic objectives, 
it does produce gaps for successfully integrating non-kinetic fires. Assessing the criteria 
for understanding the dynamic employment of non-kinetic fires requires a scope that 
appreciates the relatively young formal adoption of “information” as a function inherently 
tied to operation success. While OIE are not unique to contemporary warfare, it was not 
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until July 2017 that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff institutionalized 
“Information” as the seventh joint function (JCS, 2017, p. iii) and January 2019 that the 
USMC officially adopted “Information” as the seventh Marine Corps Warfighting 
Function (Department of the Navy, 2019, p. 1). Recognizing “information’s” immaturity 
comparable to the other six functions, the joint community must anticipate and collaborate 
on addressing the resultant implications for service and mission interoperability. 
Information Related Capabilities (IRC) have different structures and can facilitate 
more diverse (non-kinetic) effects on target than kinetic effects’ results. While kinetic 
capabilities may produce results extending beyond the physical environment (e.g., 
psychological effects in the cognitive domain), non-kinetic information capabilities are 
routinely tailored throughout the physical, information, and cognitive domains to produce 
effects. Figure 1 describes the relationship between IRC integration in the information 
environment and delivery of non-kinetic effects. In order for complementary support of 
kinetic and non-kinetic employment, the DOD needs to facilitate greater information 
operation capability training for the force at large and more creativity among information 
operation officers. 
 
Figure 1. Influence Leads to Achievement of an End(s). Source: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (2014). 
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While technical proclivity and capacities for understanding math and science are 
increasingly more important to keep pace with software-dependent weapons systems, 
expanding network capabilities, and adversary innovations, emphasis should also be placed 
on creatively applying available resources (kinetic and non-kinetic) throughout physical, 
information, and cognitive domains. Technical understanding combined with creative 
processing results in greater lethality, sustainment, and awareness of effects throughout the 
battlespace (Brose, 2020, p. 234). Creative approaches to varying degrees of conflict 
exploit operations in the information environment that use non-kinetic munitions to achieve 
specified results (Paul, 2016, p. 88).  
These operations in the information environment offer varied tactical options and 
can contribute to retaining kinetic munitions and associated payloads. Many non-kinetic 
munitions do not require resource expenditure in the same manner as kinetic munitions to 
shape the battlefield and thereby economize the cost and performance of kinetic munition 
employment. As cited in Hagy (2013), Sun Tzu (5th century B.C.E) aptly describes the 
economic prowess of non-kinetic fire integration, “to fight and conquer in all your battles 
is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance 
without fighting” (Hagy, 2013, para.2). Non-kinetic munitions can also maximize the effect 
of these retained kinetic rounds by efficiently shaping the battlespace in a manner that 
prepares the physical domain for the payload’s effect. Deciding how kinetic and non-
kinetic munitions can complement each other’s contributions to the operational scenario 
requires that operators be able to both understand the mechanisms and think critically about 
the payload effects. 
B. TRAINING 
In addition to creativity for non-kinetic munition implementation and broader 
incorporation of OIE, the target audience for identifying and challenging disinformation 
needs to expand. Disinformation tailored to American forces and targeting specific 
operating levels across the theater of operations inhibits situational awareness. Adversaries 
can appreciate the direct influence social media and instantaneous news afford and the 
effect it can have on those who receive and react to what they experience (Teo, 2008, p. 
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20). Operating in this confusion can lead planners to avoid non-kinetic fires while making 
poor tactical choices. Misinformation and disinformation can instill doubt that increases 
potential for misinterpreting signals intelligence and operationally relevant data.  
Additionally, misinformation, disinformation, and false narratives can provoke 
otherwise unintended actions. This danger compounds when, “Tactical mistakes… can 
instantly have strategic effects when picked up through new media and amplified in the 
mass media” (Rid & Hecker, 2009, p. 132). Combating the effects of manipulative 
information will increase non-kinetic target specification and mitigate unwanted influence. 
Because successful implementation of non-kinetic munitions requires the ability to 
simultaneously counter (identified) adversarial non-kinetic measures, all defense levels 
(strategic, operational, and tactical) require awareness of misinformation’s scope. As a 
National Security Specialist, Ephraim Kim (1988) explains the effects adversarial 
influence can incur on decision-making, “Strategic deception is aimed at manipulating and 
distorting the perception of reality held by the opponent’s policy makers and analysts in 
order to project a desired image and achieve strategic advantages” (p. 143). Countering 
adversarial deception and mitigating its effects enables effective offensive and defensive 
non-kinetic implementation. 
Adversarial propaganda targeting the United States military constitutes an overt 
effort to exert influence. This action is non-kinetic in nature (although propaganda can be 
used to provoke violence, discord, and mistrust). Despite this tactic not resulting in physical 
payload detonations, it warrants a response and demonstrates the potential offensive and 
defensive nature of non-kinetic munitions. This type of propaganda also emphasizes the 
rising trend of scenarios that require non-kinetic munition response availability.  
From small units to large forces, non-kinetic operation integration would become 
more institutionally viable with repeated and tailored reinforcement training to encourage 
understanding of the capabilities and personnel involved (Paul, 2016, p. 93). The form, fit, 
and function of these trainings require tailoring to promote retention, awareness, and 
alleviate hesitancy to trust non-kinetic capabilities. Additionally, creating an unclassified 
structural non-kinetic “handbook” would assist translating the technical and often 
intangible components of non-kinetic fires through a physical and simplified vehicle. 
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Similar to occupational specialty references, a grade/rank specific overview of non-kinetic 
information operation staff, high-end capabilities (including IRC explanations), and 
supportability specific to operational contexts and units would encourage integration at 
various levels.  
C. NON-KINETIC TERMINOLOGY STANDARDIZATION AND NLRP 
INTEGRATION 
In order for non-kinetic fires to better integrate with kinetic fires at all levels of 
operation, non-kinetic fire development and associated payload assignment needs to 
closely resemble kinetic fires’ equivalent processes. Figure 2 demonstrates the current 
standardized process for identifying targets (kinetic and non-kinetic). 
 
Figure 2. Joint Targeting Cycle. Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff (2019). 
While this cycle accounts for both kinetic and non-kinetic targets and the process 
is the same, different considerations must be incorporated for each phase. These separate 
(but often complimentary) considerations add to commanders’ planning and information 
processing requirements. Furthermore, the overlapping nature of the joint targeting cycle 
for both kinetic and non-kinetic fire operations emphasizes the need for specific 
requirements and effects desired in both information and physical domains. Within both 
Joint Publications (JP) 3–09, Joint Fire Support (2019) and JP 3-13, Information 
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Operations (2014), there are no mentions of “kinetic” nor are there mentions of “non-
kinetic.” This disassociation between fires, information operations, and kinetic versus non-
kinetic munition types complicates the recognition of non-kinetic munitions’ place within 
the concept of operations. Additionally, this gap hinders exploiting the information 
environment to enhance kinetic operations in the physical domain.  
Instead of “kinetic” and “non-kinetic,” JP3-09, Joint Fire Support (2019) describes 
fire effects as “lethal” and “nonlethal” (JCS, p. viii). While this is a true description of 
potential fire effect intentions, further description of munition types (kinetic versus non-
kinetic) is required. Not all non-kinetic fires are nonlethal (B. Stegner, personal 
communication, April 29, 2021), nor are all kinetic fires lethal.  
JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support (2019) further exacerbates understanding of non-kinetic 
fires when it describes “Information-Related Activities” (JCS, p. IV-6). Although only a 
slight discrepancy, the JP 3-13, Information Operations (2014) describes the same 
functions as “information related capabilities” (JCS, p. xiv). This deviation is slight but de-
values the integrity of the actual capabilities because the definition itself is not definitive. 
Furthermore, JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support (2019) states, “Some information-related 
activities supporting joint fires include:…” (JCS, p. III-12) and then proceeds to list four 
of the 14 published IRCs: Military Deception (MILDEC), Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO), Operations Security (OPSEC), and Special Technical Operations 
(STO) capabilities. Under another section, JP3-09, Joint Fire Support (2019) lists 
cyberspace operations, offensive space control, and electronic attack as joint fire support 
capabilities that are separate from information-related activities (JCS, p. x). JP3-13, 
Information Operations (2014) lists the same four IRCs from JP3-09, Joint Fire Support 
(2019) in concert with the other 10: Strategic Communication (SC), Joint Interagency 
Coordination Group, Public Affairs (PA), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Cyberspace 
Operations, Information Assurance (IA), Space Operations, Intelligence, Joint 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 
(JCS, pp. II-5 to II-13). All 14 IRCs are viable options for integrating non-kinetic fires in 
support of the scheme of maneuver.  
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Kinetic fires require target locations to exist in the physical domain. Non-kinetic 
fires do not. To account for this disparity while still enabling commanders to employ non-
kinetic fires in support of the maneuver and fires elements, NLRPs exist and are developing 
into more widely accepted standards (W. Stegner, personal communication, April 29, 
2021). Kinetic payloads are selected based on many criteria that ultimately results in 
physical impact on a specified aim point intended to shape the battlefield. NLRPs are non-
kinetic fire aim point equivalents (W. Stegner, personal communication, April 29, 2021). 
These non-kinetic aim points help bridge the targeting process divide between munition 
types. Because IRCs can vary techniques and employment levels, non-kinetic targets may 
exist across cognitive, physical, and informational domains and can be more dynamic than 
kinetic targets. 
Specifically, NLRPs seek to accommodate the Joint Targeting Cycle with non-
kinetic equivalence. During Phase 2 (target development and prioritization), NLRPs 
substantiate the unique nature of non-kinetic weapons. As William Stegner (a leader in 
NLRP development and dissemination) explains, NLRPs can accommodate the fact that 
for many OIE tasks, the physical location may not be sedentary or a fixed mark that can be 
tracked and isolated (such as an internet protocol (IP) address) (W. Stegner, personal 
communication, April 29, 2021). With this non-kinetic target aim point defined, the 
commander can more easily conduct Phase 3 (capabilities analysis) and understand how 
the individual IRCs correlate to achieving desired effects. For Phases 4 and 5 
(Commander’s decision and force assignment, and mission planning and force execution) 
the commander and planning staff are provided a more specific and detailed overview of 
the non-kinetic effects in the information and physical environments. With this more 
substantiated understanding of non-kinetic expectations and the benefits associated, 
planners are afforded greater situational awareness on the integrated nature of their kinetic 
and non-kinetic payloads.  
Considering joint doctrine publication deficiencies for kinetic and non-kinetic 
munition definitions and the benefits of NLRP adoption, DOD doctrine requires 
amendment to supplement both areas. Under JP3-13, Information Operations (2014) 
section titled, “Relationships and Integration” it describes Information Operations (IO) as 
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use of, “capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect” and defines the 14 
individual IRCs while stressing their mutual supportabilities (JCS, p. 30). However, this 
same section does not stress the mutual supportability between non-kinetic effects achieved 
via IRCs and kinetic munition effects. 
Joint publications need to reflect kinetic and non-kinetic munition “types” which 
correlate the physical and information environments. Additionally, these publications 
should specify lethal and nonlethal as the effects of these two munitions (jointly or 
separately). With these corrections in place, the joint training definition found in Joint 
Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States (2015) which states that, 
“training, including mission rehearsals, of individuals, units, and staffs using joint doctrine 
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare joint forces or joint staffs to 
respond to strategic, operational, or tactical requirements that the CCDRs consider 
necessary to execute their assigned or anticipated missions” (JCS, p. A-1) could be 
fulfilled. Non-kinetic and kinetic munition along with NLRP integration into joint doctrine 
would facilitate required joint training. 
Although commanders benefit from the introduction and implementation of 
NLRPs, there is more translation required for correlating non-kinetic targeting to non-
information operation specific leadership. Most contemporary command structures have 
developed and operated in environments that relied extensively on kinetic strike and 
countermeasure for power projection and deterrence. In order to maximize the efficiency 
of NLRPS, greater understanding of non-kinetic weapon system pairing to effects on target 
should be reinforced at command levels. If the administrative details encompassing 
information concepts of operation can be effectively communicated with command and 
fires sections, there is larger potential for complimentary implementation. Describing 
actual munitions, JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support (2019) explains that they, “are used to create 
desired effects on targets (JCS, p. 18)” but does not specify that these effects have to be 
developed by a specific munition type.  
While available doctrine and resources for referencing NLRP criteria is still largely 
in developmental stages, shared functional understanding is required for joint 
interoperability (B. Stegner, personal communication, April 29, 2021). Like any 
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warfighting function, individual services will naturally tailor concepts of operation and 
non-kinetic fire employment within their respective operating environments. However, in 
future conflicts, all components of the DOD will need to understand the basic capabilities 
and interoperability of non-kinetic targeting. 
D. TESTING 
Proficiency builds competence, confidence, and trust in weapons systems and 
operational maneuvers. This proficiency develops during basic training, is reinforced 
through military occupational specialty training, and is verified prior to deployment 
through various stages of pre-deployment joint training exercises. At various stages in 
warfighters’ development and training, many live-fire exercises are unique to kinetic 
munitions. The precision and skill necessary to employ various weapon systems in pursuit 
of commander’s objectives across the range of operations requires aggressive repetition. 
These exercises result in trust between operator and system and similar trust between 
commander and operators. 
This same model designed to build tactical proficiency and trust needs to 
reciprocate within non-kinetic operations. There are currently no required information 
operation-specific deployment preparatory training exercises equivalent to the multi-tiered 
kinetic exercises (B. Stegner, personal communication, April 29, 2021). Non-kinetic fires 
require payload and targeting to achieve a desired effect. Because of this, more emphasis 
needs to be focused on developing and training designated non-kinetic operators. 
In many ways, IRCs and NLRPs for OIE parallel kinetic weapon development 
processes in the physical environment. When integrated as means to achieve effects across 
physical, information, and cognitive domains, IRCs and NLRP identifications offer various 
opportunities to influence and disrupt adversary capabilities. However, these opportunities 
require dedicated field experimentation, analysis, evaluation, and shared critique to foster 
expansive trust and more routine use at all levels.  
Non-kinetic munitions are technically varied and often incorporate multiple 
occupational specialties operating in concert with each other. Because of this complex 
nature and the ramifications for kinetic operations executing concurrently, operators in the 
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information environment must strive for proficiency equivalent that of kinetic system 
operators. Since information operation planning and targeting is executed with kinetic 
tasking across the fleet, non-kinetic operators need to train and develop under similar 
pipelines. From individual proficiency tests to increasingly larger unit led exercises 
(culminating in joint environment scenarios executing both kinetic and non-kinetic fires), 
the warfighters preparing and executing information operations should be thoroughly 
tested on the range of non-kinetic munitions delivered through available IRCs across the 
physical, information, and cognitive domains. Once training is conducted in conjunction 
with previously standardized deployment preparations, the symbiotic nature of kinetic and 
non-kinetic fires will more easily fuse into the new standard mode of operations.  
Upon recognizing the importance of establishing non-kinetic munition operator 
training, direction needs to be focused on the criteria for establishing those proficiency 
metrics. Unlike kinetic munitions in the physical environment that result in largely 
objective effects (payload matched to desired effect on target), the same standards are not 
exactly reciprocal for non-kinetic munitions. Apart from Measures of Performance (MOP) 
and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for non-kinetic operations which, “help accomplish 
the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the 
information environment (JCS, 2014, p.72)” there need to be additional performance 
attributes associated with training and retention.  
Kinetic and non-kinetic munitions and targeting procedures share objective 
performance criteria when considered administratively, but their payload decisions and 
effects cannot be measured similarly. Furthermore, non-kinetic munition effects are even 
more detailed when evaluated against which IRC was utilized and how the NLRP was 
defined. In a study published by the British Journal of Management (2016) that was 
conducted to measure organizational performance, findings suggested that combined 
objective and subjective data collections can be as accurate as purely objective data (Singh 
S et al., 2016). This approach may be both appropriate and necessary for gauging the 
success of uniquely separate but complimentary non-kinetic targeting and munitions. The 
multi-varied effects of successful non-kinetic munitions are not as objectively quantifiable 
as kinetic munitions. 
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Officers and warfighters within the Information Operations Staff and Information 
Operations Cell should be afforded more dedicated physical space, equipment, and 
personnel to exercise IRC employment focusing on adversary threats (real and perceived). 
These individuals must also remain proficient with current technological capabilities and 
electromagnetic effects. Non-kinetic training exercises designed to simulate deployment 
operations and incorporating all levels of command with kinetic operations as appropriate 
will more substantially engrain joint interoperability and trust. Furthermore, these exercises 
could progressively reinforce approval processes, applicability, and creative problem 
solving.  
Establishing integrated and complex training exercises to develop IRC proficiency 
and tactical capabilities with kinetic operations will become even more beneficial by 
developing a formal collection of related “After Action Reports” specifically for 
information operations resulting from these exercises. Despite the changing nature of the 
information and operating environments, implementing a shared and reinforced means of 
communication specific to non-kinetic employment lessons including IRC integration with 
kinetic systems and NLRP assignment would capitalize on the overall training’s 
effectiveness. This resource should be detailed enough to require appropriate classification 
but accessible for all Technical IO Officers, IO Cell components, NPS Professors from the 
Schools of Information Sciences and Defense Analysis, and associated staff who can 
provide scientific considerations for current technological events. Additionally, this 
consortium of similar billets and responsibilities could further be broken down by 
particular information related capability, service, billet, etc., while still retaining the ability 
to communicate laterally.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
A critical component to successfully integrating kinetic and non-kinetic operations 
throughout the theater of operations is simply to reinforce and highlight the contemporary 
importance and applicability of OIE. From the early 1990s through most of the past decade, 
the U.S. largely existed as the world’s preeminent military superpower (Brose, 2020, p. 4). 
However, competitors are catching up very quickly and contemporary threats are far more 
provocative, organized, funded, and technologically capable than what current American 
military forces have addressed and learned from for the past 30 years. Furthermore, these 
adversaries are already employing non-kinetic warfare (Brose, 2020, p. 29).  
With the dawn of the information age, technological capabilities became boundless. 
While America has strongly relied on its longstanding supremacy predicated on proven 
(though aging) platforms and weapons systems (Brose, 2020, p. 228), adversaries have 
become more creative and technologically invested in the means to match and exceed the 
United States (Brose, 2020, p. 91). China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are state actors 
willing and able to assert themselves on a global scale. Although current rhetoric and 
demonstrations have not yet provoked or escalated into direct armed conflict, American 
adversaries are preparing in depth for confrontation. Although there is no present, formal 
declaration of war between the United States and its largest competitors, these adversaries 
are far from inactive in their pursuit of achieving global influence and economic, political, 
and military supremacy.  
In the physical domain, China is actively ignoring United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and building extensive military bases in the South China Sea (Campbell 
& Ratner, 2018) and after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 (Pifer, 2019) it has 
demonstratively continued to try and re-assert itself as a global superpower (Remler, 2020). 
Politically, both China and Russia seek to supersede the United States economically and 
militarily.  
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As cited in Anthony Cordesman’s strategic response analysis (2019), China’s 2019 
Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era claims that the United 
States has, “provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly 
increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, 
cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability” (2019, para. 4). China 
has also covertly invested research and resources into “Assassin’s Mace” weapons that 
exploit rivals’ capabilities (who may have more conventional military strength) while 
exacerbating sustainment operations which creates more vulnerabilities (Rickard, 2008, p. 
4). These weapon systems incorporate technological advantages and creatively seek to 
efficiently exploit American reliance on hardware and weapons platforms (Brose, 2020, p. 
32).  
As a professional within the IO community, Molly McKew (2017) cites General 
Valery Gerasimov’s 2013 article, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” (commonly 
known as the Gerasimov Doctrine), to demonstrate how it clearly defines Russia’s 
approach to contemporary conflict: “The very ‘rules’ of war have changed. The role of 
nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, 
they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is 
supplemented by military means of a concealed character” (McKew, 2017, para. 3). 
American competitors are embracing non-kinetic targeting and munitions. In order to deter 
conflict, American military services must also aggressively integrate OIE.  
Externally, adversaries have shed inhibition and openly demonstrate their kinetic 
weapons, capabilities, and technologies. In response to military parades, advertised missile 
tests, and propaganda bolstering false narratives, the U.S. needs to resist reverting to 
mirror-imaging presumed kinetic munition quantities and assumed capabilities and instead 
anticipate adversarial perspective and intention (Shore, 2008, p. 181). With the constantly 
expanding range of social media platforms and opportunities for online manipulation there 
is extensive opportunity for spreading false news and pushing narratives that shape global 
perceptions. 
False adversarial propaganda promulgated to undermine the United States and 
incite confusion is both threatening and combative. The information age extended the 
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interpretation of battle space engagement areas. American adversaries also take advantage 
of the United States’ freedom of information accessibility and online expression. 
America’s liberal approach to information dissemination and consumption is especially 
vulnerable to manipulation from adversaries who control the media. As a leader in 
counterproliferation analysis, Deborah Yarsike Ball (2017) explains, “Putin sees 
information operations as central to his efforts to undermine Western institutions and 
alliances and achieve the twin goals of breaking apart NATO and discrediting liberal 
alternatives to his autocratic rule’ (2017, p. 11). In China, nearly all social and searchable 
internet applications are censored by the government’s “Great Firewall” (Wang, 2020). 
Within these arenas non-kinetic targeting and munitions will continue to become more 
applicable and necessary. For strategic planners and military tacticians, adversarial 
influence and false propaganda will affect decisions at all levels. Countering 
misinformation and disinformation in the information and cognitive domains while 
minimizing their impact on operational maneuvers requires effective electronic warfare 
application and counterpropaganda conducted at the right levels with effective targeting.  
Adversaries have watched the U.S. operate in conflict for many years. These 
nations understand many of America’s physical maneuvers and operating techniques. They 
also recognize the temptation to match and exceed weapons systems. If an adversary can 
distract the United States’ attention away from non-kinetic capabilities and integration, it 
can exploit the reciprocal fact that America may in fact be making itself more susceptible 
to non-kinetic strikes (Sciutto, 2019). American adversaries recognize that innovative 
approaches to non-kinetic weapons systems and payloads can directly negate the perceived 
strength associated with large quantities of traditional kinetic systems (Sciutto, 2019, p. 
248). 
In order to address these aggressive maneuvers and prepare for future conflicts with 
organized, funded, and technologically advanced adversaries, the United States must 
embrace non-kinetic fire’s importance and merge its capabilities into offensive and 
defensive operations. As kinetic weapons systems and adversarial range (across multiple 
domains) becomes more dynamic and lethal, forces will need to minimize time spent in the 
weapon engagement zone (WEZ). If the U.S. relies primarily on kinetic munitions and 
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neglects to incorporate non-kinetic capabilities, it will be introducing unnecessary and 
dangerous vulnerabilities. Gaining more diverse capabilities to operate further outside the 
WEZ and with more non-kinetic options enables greater risk assumption and response time.  
The definition and interpretation of battlefields and conventional warfare are 
changing. These changes are not unique to a single state or nation. Additionally, these 
changes create friction for planners, policy makers, and those who have become fluent 
under previous operating conditions. Previous warfare doctrine and practice necessitated 
physical domain control and exploitation. As military platforms become more dependent 
on software, machine learning grows more resilient and capable of processing immense 
loads of information, artificial intelligence becomes more adaptable, network connectivity 
and control of the electromagnetic spectrum become harder to defend against exploitation, 
and influence techniques grow more calculated, OIE becomes more critical to facilitating 
kinetic munition’s success (Brose, 2020, p. 173).  
Considering national capabilities, international threat postures, and the changing 
nature of war and conflict, greater attention needs to shift toward defining information 
operation “needs” in order to definitively recognize non-kinetic applicability. In addition 
to identifying these needs, the U.S. must assume a more collective effort toward embracing 
non-kinetic and kinetic response mechanisms. Non-kinetic capability and information 
operations have to be understood not just as viable options but in many cases as the correct 
response (in part or whole). As Dr. Everett M. Rogers (1962) describes, “one dimension of 
compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as meeting the needs of the 
client system. When felt needs are met, a faster rate of adoption usually occurs” (p. 246). 
Due to the nature of most non-kinetic operations and the relatively small allotment of 
specialists and personnel (compared to the rest of the military and kinetic operators), 
experiencing and disseminating the benefits of information operations is challenging. 
However, trust in kinetic fires’ effects does not require non-kinetic exclusion. Dr. Rogers 
(1962) continues to explain, “Compatibility of an innovation with a preceding idea can 
either speed up or retard its rate of adoption. Old ideas are the main mental tools that 
individuals utilize to assess new ideas and give them meaning” (p. 243). While 
understandable, it is an incomplete view to measure non-kinetic munitions through the lens 
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of kinetic understanding. Although non-kinetic techniques are not new ideas, the 
composition and implementation of information operations must remain continuously 
innovative.  
In many aspects, information capabilities and non-kinetic fires are conceptually 
different than previous operations across the same domains. These differences can 
exacerbate the ability for associations between conventional, kinetic operations and 
innovative, non-kinetic capabilities. Despite initial difficulties recognizing the 
complementary nature of non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities, many individuals may be 
tempted to associate quality with perceived effect (Lewin, 1936, p. 19). 
It is important to remember that non-kinetic and kinetic munitions can rarely be 
measured by the same standards. However, this does not diminish the quality of either 
capability. Dr. Kurt Lewin (1936) comments how, “it is clear that one must distinguish 
between ‘appearance’ and the ‘underlying reality’ in a dynamic sense” (p. 19). The United 
States’ present international relations and the varying hostilities of peer adversaries should 
direct focus toward appreciating information operations as a more comprehensive and 
natural addition to defense posture. Assumptions based on the “appearance” of physical 
munitions and their calculated payloads cannot blind decision-makers from recognizing 
the need and impact of non-kinetic fire effects. 
As many adversaries continue to develop economically and centralize more 
political control, their technological focus on military capabilities is shifting toward larger 
arsenals of more diverse munitions applicable to information and physical environments 
(Brose, 2020, p. 198). Defensive planning that relies too heavily on kinetic munition 
quantities and capabilities is dangerous. Larger arsenals can become larger vulnerabilities 
and susceptible to enemy exploitation. Additionally, large, and complex kinetic munitions 
will always be constrained by defense acquisition system resources and processing.  
B. EXPANSION AND SUSTAINMENT 
In addition to administrative and conceptual transitions toward more fully adopting 
non-kinetic munitions throughout military operations, the DOD must increase financial and 
resource investment in information capabilities, research, and development (Paul, 2016, p. 
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5). In fiscal year 2020, $718.3 billion were allotted to the DOD. Of this amount, 
approximately $7.462 billion went toward emerging technologies, $14.1 billion went 
toward space operations, and $9.6 billion went toward cyber operations (Under Secretary 
of Defense, 2020, pp. 2–4). While this may appear relatively small in comparison to overall 
spending on platforms, kinetic munitions, and sustainment requirements, this dedicated 
investment needs to maximize returns for strategic planning and warfighter functionality. 
Capitalizing on talent, minimizing bureaucracy, and incorporating end user input 
are critical for maximizing non-kinetic systems development (Brose, 2020, p. 228). As the 
current and future non-kinetic systems become more dynamic, reliable, and interoperable 
with existing military systems, they will also become more trusted (Brose, 2020, p. 124). 
By nature of its democratic government, the U.S. has to work more creatively to meet these 
end goals and compete with its adversaries. China’s “Civil-Military Fusion” unites civilian 
researchers, commercial technology industries, and military/defense industries in an effort 
to turn the People’s Liberation Army into the most technologically advanced military in 
the world (U.S. Department of State, 2020). China’s Communist Government can control 
the pace at which it achieves military dominance (kinetic and non-kinetic). In turn, the U.S. 
has to adapt to the same problem (achieving technological supremacy for its military) 
within the bounds of Constitutional processes.  
A key ingredient for balancing kinetic hardware and legacy platform functionality 
in the DOD with non-kinetic munitions includes adapting commercial technology into 
military systems (Brose, 2020, p. 106). The acquisitions process for non-kinetic systems 
technology should not necessarily mimic the equivalent process for service-specific 
hardware platforms, munitions, and kinetic technology. Software engineering is relatively 
young when compared to hardware design (Rendon & Snider, 2019, p. 110). Non-kinetic 
systems need better defined design parameters that account for applicable interoperability 
with existing kinetic systems.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis attempted to identify the historical circumstances and present conditions 
contributing to the need for non-kinetic munition integration with kinetic munitions 
throughout military operations. After establishing the need, this thesis sought to discover the 
gaps and deficiencies within the physical and informational environments that are impeding 
non-kinetic/kinetic munition integration and offer solutions to overcoming these obstacles. 
The future of warfare and American roles within combat will fundamentally require 
incorporation and exploitation of OIE. Greater attention focusing on the behavioral, 
developmental, and procedural aspects of military operations are necessary in order to 
determine the extent of practices that inhibit non-kinetic munition integration within the DOD. 
Behavioral research indicates cognitive bias and influence factors can deter 
confidence and reliance on non-kinetic munitions. Cognitive biases and influence factors 
require more consistent acknowledgement, understanding, and response measures to 
minimize potentially inhibiting effects that result in reinforcing over-reliance on kinetic 
warfare options. To counter this, the DOD should focus on defining (and standardizing) non-
kinetic definitions throughout joint and service specific publications. Additionally, these 
defining resources should approach non-kinetic munitions and their payloads’ potential for 
producing effects within the information and physical environments with the same methodical 
attention as kinetic systems. Incorporating such definitions and concepts throughout joint 
doctrine and service publications will facilitate better understanding of non-kinetic targeting, 
available payloads and associated effects, and enable further development of information 
operation roles, training, proficiency, and testing. Dedicated testing and required training 
exercises for non-kinetic munitions will facilitate confidence using IRCs at all levels of 
command and creativity in support of maneuver elements. Continued NLRP development and 
dissemination will advance this incorporation and substantiate non-kinetic fires’ place within 
payload developments and targeting cycles.  
Advanced research should continue to identify existing barriers in the physical 
environment and potentially inhibiting aspects of the information environment that prevent 
non-kinetic munition integration. Further, this continued research should work to discover the 
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underlying processes contributing to these barriers in order to alleviate those constrictions and 
prevent recurring impedance. Suggested areas for study include disseminating and 
maintaining consistently defined non-kinetic munitions and information environment 
descriptions from strategic level joint documents down through service-specific publications 
and doctrine. Accompanying the standardization and incorporation of these definitions, joint 
and service-specific non-kinetic testing range development requirements must develop in 
order to ensure IRC understanding and proficiency. These non-kinetic live-fire training 
exercises spanning strategic, operational, and tactical levels of joint and service-specific 
efforts require effectiveness metrics that enable information planners and commanders to 
evaluate combat readiness. These exercises must also be intertwined with information 
planners’ required pre-deployment exercises and sustainment proficiencies. Additionally, 
these exercises and training environments must enable and share creative approaches to 
employing and exploiting information tools and capabilities alongside kinetic munitions. 
Part of developing creativity to maximize effectiveness and adapt to various threat 
levels also requires sustained pursuit of commercial technology incorporation (Brose, 2020). 
Research into the means and effects of evaluating and encouraging civilian software and 
technology tailored to non-kinetic munition development will increase opportunities for 
information capabilities independent (and in support of) kinetic munitions while directly 
enhancing tools for information operators. Additionally, pursuit of technology that enables 
non-kinetic effectiveness will alleviate reliance on platform-centric warfare (Brose, 2020, p. 
76) that stifles response opportunities to adversarial provocations. Identifying and addressing 
individual aspects preventing non-kinetic munition integration facilitates focus on required 
and corresponding institutional changes.  
Sustaining the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic munitions across the theater of 
military operations will require broad attention and joint focus to ensure effective support for 
maneuver elements and information operations. As the U.S. continues to deter conflict and 
promote international security despite near-peer competitors growing increasingly more 
confrontational, non-kinetic munition options will become more necessary for success. This 
integration will amplify force readiness, lethality, and flexibility to dynamically respond to 
changing operating environments.  
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